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v. 
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rom E.D. Mo. 
Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appt challenges the TC's finding that the 
U) disclosure ~ rivate use, an~ andatory '~rbitratio: provisions of -the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) 
?re unconstitutional because they authorize a taking of property -
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2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Appee 1s a corporation 
A 
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling synthetic 
f'bers and chemicals. One of its major lines of business is the 
development, manufacture, and marketing of pesticides. In order 
to sell a pesticide in the United States, appee must register the 
pesticide with the EPA. Included in the information that appee 
must file with the EPA is a variety of test data showing that the 
pesticide will not cause unreasonable adverse effects on the en-
vironment. The information that appee has on file with the EPA /~ 
cost appee approximately $23,600,000 to develop. Wv2<./ .1 ~ 
~-°(> 
As amended in 1978, FIFRA provides that an applicant may have -
a right to rely on data previously submitted by another appli-
~-------------~~------------------------------------
cant. The extent of the use of previously submitted data depends 
on the date of the previous registration. If the data was filed 
between 12/31/69 and 9/30/78, a subsequent applicant may cite the 
data, but the new applicant must offer to compensate the original 
applicant for the use of the information. 7 u.s.c. 
§136a(c) (1) (D) (ii) (Supp. V). If the parties cannot agree on the 
amount of compensation, they must submit the compensation issue 
to binding, nonreviewable arbitration. Ibid. This scheme stays 
in effect for 15 years after the original filing. If the data 
first is submitted after 9/30/78, the original applicant has 
"exclusive use" of the data for ten years and a new applicant may 
not cite the data without the written permission of the original 
applicant during that period. §136a(c) (1) (D) (i). After the ap-
plicable 10 and 15 year periods expire, or at any time if the 
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sider the data without limitation. §136a(c) (1) (D) (iii). Con-
gress's purpose in passing the "internal use" provisions was to 
promote competition in the pesticide industry by making it easier 
for small and new companies to file applications. 
I/ ~ 
The 1978 amendments also added some new disclosure procedures 
to FIFRA. Under §136h(d), the EPA must make all health and safe-
ty ~ t,o the public. This disclosure requirement 
does not apply, however, to information relating to manufacturing 
or quality control processes, or information describing inert 
ingredients added to a pesticide. §136h (d) (1). Congress based 
the new disclosure provisions on the public's need to oversee and 
be involved in the registration process. 
Appee filed suit in federal district court seeking an injunc-
~ . 
tion against the internal use and disclosure provisions of FIFRA. 
The TC granted the injunction. The TC pointed out that most of 
IL ~ 
the information filed with the EPA qualifies as trade secrets 
under state law. As trade secrets, the data is intellectual 
property. The 5th Amendment protects this property from being 
taken by the government for private purposes or without payment 
of just compensation. 
/ 
The TC used the factors enumerated in Penn Central Transpor-
t at ion Co • v . New York Ci t y , 4 3 8 u . S • 10 4 ( 19 7 8) to determine 
whether there had been a "taking" of appee's trade secrets. The 
TC stated that Penn Central required it to examine 1) the nature 
of the government intrusion on appee's property interests; 2) the 
economic impact of the intrusion on the appee; and 3) the extent 
to which the intrusion furthers the public interest. Applying 
r· 
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these factors to the internal use aspects of FIFRA the TC noted 
that the use that appee's competitors could make of appee's data 
was an intrusion on appee's right to exclusive use of its trade 
secrets. The TC found that this intrusion would have a substan-
tial economic impact on appee. The TC also found that the public 
had little to gain from the internal use of the data. The TC 
dismissed Congress's finding that the public had an interest in 
increased compet i tion because the pesticide industry is already 
highly competitive. Thus, the only parties that benefit from the 
internal use provisions are appee's competitors. 
The first two Penn Central factors apply with the same force 
to the disclosure provisions of FIFRA. Obviously, disclosure is 
designed to benefit the public. The TC found, however, that the 
public benefit derived from disclosure is minimal. The TC noted 
that the EPA scrutinizes all information submitted to it and 
evaluates the health and safety aspects of the pesticides. The 
TC also noted that the label on a pesticide container gives de-
tailed information regarding the pesticide's ingredients. The TC 
also made a novel finding without citation of authority -- the 
disclosure requirements are beyond Congress's regulatory power 
set out in the Commerce Clause because the provision is not a 
regulation of commerce. 
The TC next considered whether' FIFRA provided just compensa-
tion for the takings caused by the internal use and disclosure. --------------------------- ____/ The TC found that Congress intended for the exclusive use and 
compensation provisions of FIFRA to be the sole compensation for 
the use and disclosure of an applicant's data. Thus, an appli-
l'iU • 0 ~-.1.;;, V n,: A r:--;;,- - • 
- -
cant had no right to bring a separate action under the Tucker Act 
to seek additional compensation from the Government. According 
to the TC, FIFRA's requirement of mandatory arbitration when the 
parties cannot agree on the appropriate amount of compensation 
gives the arbitrator too much discretion and is an unconstitu-
tional delegation of judicial authority to a non-Article III 
forum. Finally, the TC noted that several other courts have con-
sidered the scheme set out in FIFRA and found it to be constitu-
tional. See Mobay Chemical Co. v. Costle, 519 F. Supp. 252 (W.D. 
Pa. 1981), aff'd, 682 F. 2d 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 103 
s.ct. 343 (1982); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 499 F. Supp. 
732 (D. Del. 1980), aff 'd, 641 F. 2d 104 (3rd Cir.), cert.denied, 
452 U.S. 961 (1981); Petrolite Corp. v. EPA, 519 F. Supp. 966 
(D. D. C. 1981). 
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG argues that Congress clearly 
has authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate pesticide 
~ 
licensing. The internal use and disclosure provisions of FIFRA 
are rational means of accomplishing Congress's goals of in 
-~ volving the public in the registration process, making the regis-
6rh ~
~
h ration process efficient, and promoting competition in the pes-
t \' 
/ icide industry. Appee has ho property interest in its trade 
secrets that are on file with the EPA because they are no longer 
t2,,l,t'~ - con~ Even if appee has a property interest in the data, 
r.~there has been no taking under Penn Central. There has been no 
0""-'~ J,~ ~ 
~ ~ ~fcal invasion of appee 's property. Interference 
~.., rig
1
ht of exclusive use affects only one, unimportant aspect of 
with the 
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of exclusive use is minimal because appee is protected by the 10--
year exclusive use and compensation provisions. 
""----' ~ ,.,______.'.:), 
Public disclosure is not a __t_aJs.i!l9 ~ ause it only applies to 7 
"------- - -- - ---·---~ ' 
health and safety informantion. Even this disclosure is prohib-
i tef here- the informat-ion- -;_. efers to manufacturing and quality 
control processes and inert ingredients. The Court has approved 
similar schemes in related fields where the public's health and 
safety is involved. Even if there has been a taking, an injunc-
tion is not an appropriate remedy, citing Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 94 n.39 (1978). The 
FIFRA scheme is duly authorized by Congress and serves a public 
purpose. More importantly, FIFRA does not foreclose an action l 
under the Tucker Act if the arbitration procedure does not result 
in just compensation. 
Appee seeks an affirmance, relying on the TC's reasoning. 
Appee contends that the constitutional protections for its prop-
erty are not diminished by filing its trade secrets with the EPA. 
Unlike tangible property, the most important aspect of trade se-
crets is the ~ e ~c~ e ~ - This right is protected by 
the 5th Amendment, citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 16 4, 179-180 ( 1980) • The internal use prov is ions of FIFRA 
allow appee 's competitors to avoid avoid much expense, thereby 
improving their competitive position at the expense of appee. 
Public disclosure of health and safety data is also a taking be-
cause disclosure of a trade secret renders _the secret almost val-
ueless. The taking authorized by FIFRA is for private use and 
- ·-----
No. 83-196 AFX - - page 7. 
without just compensation. The arbitration provisions are inade-
quate and a Tucker Act remedy is unavailable. 
4. DISCUSSION: The parties do not dispute that the 
Court has jurisdiction over this case under 28 u.s.c. §1252. Be-
cause the other federal courts that have considered this question 
have reached a different result and the issues are complex, a 
summary affirmance or reversal is no t---a-~priate 
s. REC OMME NDA TI ON : I recommend that the Court note 
probable jurisdiction. 
There is a response. 
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Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 
No. 83-196 
~ !> /~ 
~ 
David A. Charny February 20, 1984 
Question Presented 
Whether the EPA' ~ ublic disclosure of trade secrets 
submitted by an applicant for pesticide registration, a ~ se of 
these trade secrets {i ~f-~ide regi~trations of other 






bench memo: Ruckel1 
Outline 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
II. Discussion 
A. Property Interest in Trade Secrets 
B. Taking 
C. Tucker Act Remedy 
D. Public Purpose 
III. Conclusion 









'" bench memo: Ruckels- us v. Monsanto Co. - page 3. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory - Background 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide ~ t 
of 1947 (FIFRA) has required registration of pesticides, formerly 
with the Department of Agriculture and now with the Environmental 
/47~ 
Protection Agency. As subsequently amended, the Act now requires &f-
that an applicant for registration provide the chemical composi-
tion of the pesticide, its contemplated uses and effects, and 
~ --------------- -
information establishing that the pesticide is safe and does not 
have "unreasonable adverse effects on the environment." 
Prior to 1972, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 u.s.c. §1905, 
" ==---- ~ ,, prohibited public disclosure of trade secrets provided to the 
• government under FIFRA. The present parties dispute the govern-9~/oment's ~ olicy a s to '::e of trade secrets submitted by one manu-
~ facturer in considering subsequent applications for registration 
-, by other manufacturers. No statutory provision addressed the ? 
'2,,,,~ question. ~ 197¥, Congress amended FIFRA to prohibit EPA from 
~ disclosing trade secrets and from granting registration to one 
~ company on the basis of another's trade secrets unless the latter 
~ co~sented. EPA freely could consider other information, although 
-:::, 1,~ pany that received registration on the basis of a second 
~ ny's information would have to compensate that company. 
~ ~ I ~ 197~ , Congress again amended FIFRA. The present sui 
~ - -challenges the constitutionality of two provisions of the amend- ~ 
IA,,,..-
in the "data consi~e ~ tion" provision, Congress I ~ 
company to obtain a registration on the basis of ~-~ 
l4-7f 
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• bench memo: Ruckels- us v. Monsanto Co. - page 4. 
if the information was a trade secret. 7 u.s.c. §136a{c) (1) (D). 
Compensation for use of the information was to be negotiated be-
tween the two companies; if the negotiations failed, a company 
could obtain compensation only by submitting its claim to an ar-
bitrator, whose decision was final. Id. §136a{c) (1) (D) (ii). 
e3 in th~ "data disclosure" provision, Congress 
health and safety information available upon request 
of the public, except that foreign and multinational 
made all (~ 
to members ) 1-'D , 
pesticide ~ 
companies could not submit requests. Id. §136a(c) (2) (A); §136h. 
B. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Appee Monsanto C~ challenged the constitutionality of 
th '1?ata consideration anW;sc~osure provisions in federal DC. 
The DC held that the statute violated the Fifth Amendment because 
it took appee's property without compensation. The DC found that ~ -
Missouri recognized a property right in trade secrets as defined ~'J-
~ 
by the Restatement of Torts, which prohibits disclosure of trade ~ 
 
secrets unless privileged. The DC held that internal use of the 
data by the EPA "implicitly amounts, for all practical purposes, 
to disclosure of the data to Monsanto's competitors •... " 
b-5--, The DC found that FIFRA took Monsanto's "right to ex-- ~ 
elude" others from use of the data. In addition, a~pee's suf-
fered substantial economic loss from the availability of its 
trade secrets to competitors. Further, the DC concluded that the 
provisions served a private rather than a public purpose -- to 
enrich appee's competitors. The public disclosure provisions 
~
were not necessary for the public to determine whether products 
were safe and effective, because EPA itself determined the safety 
• bench memo: Ruckels- us v. Monsanto Co . - page 5. 
of the products and the product's label provided information as 
to "nature, contents and purpose" of the product. Final-
ly, the DC found that there was no adequate provision for compen-
sation under the Act. The arbitration provisions were inadequate 
because there was no provision for judicial review and no statu-r -
arbitra- r ..r 
, .. ~~--· ~, ---=---=-----,---,::--------:---::----:----:----:--=---~--tor's decision. (The DC also found that delegation to arbitra-tory guidance as to the factors that were to guide the 
tors of the power to determined the amount of compensation vio-
lated Article III.) ~ or did the Tucker Act provide compensation 
for the taking of appee's property. The arbitration scheme was 
intended to be the sole remedy for takings under FIFRA; Congress 
had determined that the competitor, rather than the United 
States, should pay the original submitter of data. 
The DC enjoined use or disclosure of apee's data by the 
EPA. 
II. Discussion 
A. Property Interest in Trade Secrets ~ 
It seems clear that trade secrets are property protected 
~ 
by the takings clause. Sandlin v. Johnson, 141 F.2d 660, 661 
(CAB 1944), upon which the DC relied in finding that Missouri law 
protected trade secrets, describes the owner's interest in these 
secrets as a "property right." And trade secrets have the char--acteristics of more conventional rights in real or personal prop-- -------------erty -- the owner acquires the trade secrets through his own ef-
forts, possesses the secrets to the exclusion of others, and may 
alienate or devise the secrets. There is no reason why a proper-
ty interest in trade secrets, like that in a patent or copyright, 
• bench memo: .Ruckels Co. page 6. -~~ 1-
~I- s-U.. ~-
should not fall within the takings clause. The government's ar-
guments to the contrary that the federal government preempted 
state trade secret law, and that trade secrets only enjoy limited 
protection under state law -- both prove too much. The Fifth 
Amendment, if it is to have any ~orce, must restrict the power of 
•' -,, 
the federal government to preempt the sta~e law of property~ and 
the Amendment must protec~ed ' "limited" property interest, as few 
property rights enjoy absolute protection at common law. 
~ 
B. Taking 
The DC found that appee's rights in its trade secrets 
were defined by the Restatement of Torts, §757. That section 
states that "one who discloses or uses another's trade secret, 
without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if (a) he 
discovered the secret by improper means, or (b) his disclosure o 
use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by the ot 
/ 
er in disclosing the secret to him •••• " Apparently, the theory 
of the DC and appee is that EPA has "taken" the property by 
dislosing the data without a privilege to do so and in breach of 
' ' 
confidence reposed in EPA by appee. Otherwise, as the government 
contends, the government would not have violated appee's property 
rights in the data, as appee would have given up its property 
rights in the information by handing it over to the government. 
Clearly, there is no taking of property as to informa-
tion submitted under FIFRA as amended in 1978. Appee is now on 
notice that data submitted by it will be made public or used by 
other competitors as permitted by the Act. It cannot reasonably 
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secrets. Nor does the government "take" appee's trade secrets by 
improperly requiring disclosure of those secrets in exchange for 
a license. The government may attach reasonable conditions, in-
' eluding charging of fees, to issuance of a license; I see nothing 
that prevents it from exacting a payment in kind that reasonably 
advances the purposes of the licensing program. The data consid-
eration and disclosure requirements reduce the total costs of the 
licensing program to the industry, foster competition and permit 
public scrutiny of the data upon which the EPA relies in issuing 
licenses. These purposes appear sufficient to justify the re-
quirement that an applicant for a license disclose otherwise con-
fidential data to its competitors and the public. 
Similarly, the data consideration do not appear to ac-
r 
complish a taking of data submitted prior to 1970. The DC's 
finding that the Dept. of Agriculture and EPA followed a policy 
of not using data previously submitted by competitors appears to 
be clearly erroneous. As the government observes, the premise of 
congressional action in 1972 was that EPA used data submitted by 
competitors; the 1972 legislation was enacted in response to in-
dustry criticism of this practice. The EPA reaffirmed the policy 
on several occasions. Sees. Rep. No. 92-838 (1972); EPA Office 
of Pesticide Programs, FIFRA: Impact on the Industry, s. Rep. 95-
334, at 34 (1977). Apparently, the only testimony at trial in 
the court below supported this interpretation of EPA policy; al-
though the DC also considered evidence that had been introduced 
before other courts on this issue, these courts had reached the 
contrary conclusion. Chevron Chemical Co. v. Costle, 641 F.2d 
• 
• 
bench memo: Ruckels - page 8 . 
104, 109 (CA3 1981); Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Costle, 517 F. Supp. 
254, 267 n.11 (W.D. PA. 1981). 
However, data submitted between 1970 and 1978 were pro-
tected under the 1970 FIFRA Amendments, that were interpreted to 
prevent use of trade secrets to approve competitors' registra-
tions without consent of the manufacturer that had submitted the 
data. And the Trade Secrets Act, 18 u.s.c. §1905, forbad disclo-
sure of all trade secrets submitted before 1978. In revealing 
its trade secrets to the government, appee apparently reposed 
confidence in the government that these secrets would not be re-
vealed to the public or used to benefit competitors. Appee jus-
tifiably may ely upon these statutes to demonstrate that its 
trade secrets remained law when divulged 
to the government, even though these government statutes in them-
selves might not create a property right in the submitted infor-
mation. 
To this extent, the 1978 FIFRA amendments that provide 
for publication of trade secrets appear to authorize a taking of 
trade secrets su!Ymitted by appee under the previous law. Al-~___.._,___... 
though to determine whether agovernme; t action is taking in-
volves an "ad hoc, fac_tual inquiry, " it seems clear that a total 
expropriation of property is taking. See Penn Central Transp. 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Publication of 
the data is a such an appropriation. FIFRA does not merely pre-
vent appee from making certain uses of its trade secrets. When a 
trade secret is made public or freely available to competitors, 
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data and cannot exclude others from possessing and using it. 
Thus, FIFRA does not merely regulate appee's use of its data. It 
is like the government's seizure or permanent occupation of a 
plot of land, not like a zoning ordinance or the prohibition of a 
nuisance. Cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 426-435 (1982) (permanent government seizure of land, 
in contrast to regulation, is always a taking, regardless of eco-
nomic impact}. Although the Court has never considered the 
standards to be applied to an complete appropriation of intellec-
tual, as opposed to tangible property, I see no grounds for con-
sidering intellectual property more readily subject to seizure by 
the government. 
As the government observes, it is true that appee may 
still make unrestricted use of the data. For intellectual prop-
erty, unlike tangible property, however, unrestricted use of the 
property by one "owner" is consistent with unrestricted use by 
others. For that reason, the right to use the property should 
not be considered one of the "sticks" of the "bundle" of property 
rights that the Court considers in deciding whether what remains 
of the property right after government action is sufficient to 
defeat a takings claim. Rather, as permanent denial of the 
"right to exclude" itself may constitute a taking of physical 
property, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176-
180 (1979), that is~ fortiori the case for intellectual proper-
ty. For example, if the government retroactively revoked copy-
right and patent protections for certain works, it would be no 
answer to a takings challenge to say that the copyright holder 
• 
• 
bench memo: RuckelsF v. Monsanto Co. - page 10 . 
~ 
retains the rightA ead or publish the formerly copyrighted work, 
or that the inventor can still manufacture the formerly patented 
invention. If an intellectual property right is not exclusive, f~ 
it is no right at all. 
The Court has also considered the degree of interference 
with "investment-backed expectations" in deciding whether govern-
ment action accomplishes a taking. However, mere diminution, I 
rather than destruction, of the value of property does not suf- r 
fice to establish a takings claim. See, e.g., Penn Central 
Transp. Co., 438 U.S., at 131. Here, it is arguable that appee 
has not suffered an interference with "investment-backed expecta-
tions" so great as to constitute a destruction of property. 
Appee's investment in development of this information could have 
been aimed primarily at acquiring the initial registration; i.e., 
appee could have expected to recoup its investment largely 
through sales of registered pesticides. Further, the loss of 
competitive advantage that the DC found to be a consequence of 
data disclosure may not prevent appee from receiving a fair re-
turn on its investment in developing the data. It is conceiv-
/J4,.,. ~ 
able, for example, that appee already ~ recovered much of its 
investment; further, appee will profit from use of its data by 
competitors under the data consideration provisions of FIFRA, 
that require the competitor to compensate the manufacturer that 
originally submitted data upon which the competitor relies. The 
record thus does not appear to support a claim that the govern-
ment entirely has d ~stro~ ed appee's i nvestment-backed exeecta-
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er, as FIFRA nonetheless accomplishes a complete expropriation of 
appee's property rights in the data for the - reasons noted above. 7~ 
Once that is established, the value of the property taken by 




Finally, the government maintains that the statute ,,..____ 
valid because it furthers public purposes, particularly because 
it merely requires the manufacturer to inform the public of the 
safety of his product. Cf. National Fertilizer Ass'n v. Bradley, 
301 U.S. 178 (1937). The fact that the statute advances a pub-
lic purpose cannot suffice to establish its constitutionality, as 
all statutes that take private property are required to do so, 
even where compensation is required. And the disclosure of trade 
secrets without compensation cannot be justified by the public's 
need to be informed of product safety. To further the public's 
need to know, Congress may require disclosure as a condition for 
a license to sell products, in effect compelling sellers to give 
up their ownership of trade secrets for the privilege of market-
ing their products. But the public disclosure provision at issue 
here extends to all information now held by the EPA, including 
that submitted for previously registered pesticides. 7 u.s.c. 
§136h(d) (1). When appee submitted this information to the gov 
~ 
~ 
ernment, it fully preserved its property rights in this inform~-
tion under the law in effect at that time. If the government 
wishes now to violate those rights, it must compensate appee. 
C. Tucker Act Remedy 
If there is a taking of property, the Tucker Act pro-
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provide just compensation unless Congress explicitly manifested 
its intent to withdraw the remedy. This accords with the view 
that repeals by implication are disfavored and that statutes 
should be construed, where possible, to uphold their constitu-
tionality. See Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 
102, 126-134. 
l 
Resp's arguments that the Tucker Act remedy is incon-
sistent with FIFRA are unconvincing. 
amended FIFRA to discourage trade secret litigation, its concern 
First, although Congress 
was that this litigation delayed the process of registering new 
pesticides. Suit in the Court of Claims would interpose no de-
lay, as the EPA could proceed with registration while the suit 
was pending. The availability of Tucker Act compensation also is 
consistent with the negotiation and arbitration provisions of 
FIFRA. There is no taki ~ rop~ to ~ he extent that compen-
sation is available from private parties under FIFRA. The compa-
ny can receive compensation from the government only to the ex-
tent that the compensation from the private parties who benefit 
from government use of the data is inadequate. And companies 
would not be eligible for Tucker Act compensation if their data 
was not made public. Thus, the negotiation and arbitration 
scheme established by Congress would remain an important means of . 
compensating owners of trade secrets. 
Nor has the Tucker Act remedy been withdrawn because 
Congress has failed to appropriate monies to provide compensa-
tion. Although congressional appropriations were a factor that 
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Reorganization Act Cases, this factor was important only because 
the contrary argument rested "on provisions of the Rail Act said 
plainly to evince Congress' determination that no federal funds 
beyond those expressly committed by the Act were to be paid ••.• " 
419 U.S., at 102. In contrast, no provision of FIFRA even argu-
ably limits appropriation of funds to honor judgments under the 
Tucker Act. 
D. Public Purpose 
~ ~ Tu.:: ~L.-r/~ 
Even if the Tucker Act 
- ~~~~t::J-... 
rov1des compensation, FIFIRA 1s ~-
~ ivate rather than ~ --t unconstitutional if accomplishes 
pub~ . 
. / 
It is well established, however, that Congress 
may transfer property from one private party to another if it 
determines that the t~ansfer - furthers a public purpose. See 
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (upholding urban renewal 
program that transfers land to private developers). Thompson v. 
Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U.S. 55 (1937), upon which appee 
heavily relies, is not to the contrary, as the Court there found 
that the transfer of property served no public benefit. In con-
trast, the transfer of property here does not merely benefit 
appee's competitors, but also benefits the public by fostering 
competition and permitting public scrutiny of EPA's licensing 
decisions. --III. Conclusion 
Because the Tucker Act provides compensation for any 
taking that FIFRA might accomplish, the Court may reverse the DC 
and uphold the statute without reaching the constitutional issue 
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this issue for a number of reasons. It is generally prudent to 
avoid constitutional adjudication where possible. A number of 
the particular constitutional questions posed by the case may not 
arise again. Whether there is a ta 'ng depends in part upon the 
I 
law in effect when the information was submitted to the EPA. The 
extent of protection provided under current law also yaries_!lth 
the age of the information and the date it was submitted. Thus, 
there are many possible statutory permutations that provide a 
background for the constitutional analysis; it would seem best to -
leave this analysis to case-by-case adjudication as these cases 
proceed before the Court of Claims. Also, it is possible that 
appee may not bring individual suits for compensation. Its main 
interest in the present suit surely was to enjoin the program as 
a whole, not to gain compensation. As yet, there is no indica-
tion of substantial reliance upon its trade secrets or of numer-
ous requests for public disclosure. And the arbitration scheme 
has not yet been tested. Appee may be satisfied with whatever 
compensation it receives and so not press the issue in the 
courts. In any event, the courts best would consider the takings 
claim in light of experience with the compensation mechanism that 
Congress has provided. 
The fundamental constitutional issue posed by the case 
~ 
-4<.-~ 
is unprecedented. The Court has never determined which strands 
of the bundle of intellectual property must be nullified by the 
government before a taking occurs. Because intellectual property 
is quite different from more tangible real or personal property, 
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And, as to the issue of the "public purposes" that justify a tak-
ing, Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, No. 83-141, to bear-
gued in March, may prompt the court to reconsider or limit cases 
such as Parker v. Berman, supra. There is thus reason to avoid 
reaching the difficult constitutional issues posed by this case. 
.. 
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1st DRAFT la/7 
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATE§d_ ~ 
No. 83-196 ~/---~ /4.__ 
WILLIAM D. RUCKELSHAUS, ADMINISTRATO~ ~ 
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION--'i- -F A 
AGENCY v. MONSANTO COMPANY a-~
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR ~ ~ 
. THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
[June-, 1984] _ ~~ 
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. ~ 
In this case, we are asked to review a United States Dis- J_,,L..f_ r 
trict Court's determination that several provisions of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA), 61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 136 et seq., 
are unconstitutional. The provisions at issue authorize the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to use data submit-
ted by an applicant for registration of a pesticide 1 in evaluat-
ing the application of a subsequent applicant, and to disclose 
publicly some of the submitted data. 
I 
Over the past century, the use of pesticides to control 
weeds and minimize crop damage caused by insects, disease, 
and animals has become increasingly more important for 
American agriculture. See S. Rep. No. 95-334, p. 32 (1977); 
S. Rep. No. 92-838, pp. 3-4, 6-7 (1972); H. R. Rep. No. 
92-511, pp. 3-7 (1971). While pesticide use has led to im-
provements in productivity, it has also led to increased risk of 
1 F or purposes of our discussion of FIFRA, the term "pesticides" in-
cludes herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides, and plant regula-
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harm to humans and the environment. See S. Rep. No. 
92-838, at 3-4, 6-7; H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 3-7. Al-
though the Federal Government has regulated pesticide use 
for nearly 75 years,2 FIFRA was first adopted in 1947. 61 
Stat. 163. 
As first enacted, FIFRA was primarily a licensing and la-
belling statute. It required that all pesticides be registered 
with the Secretary of Agriculture prior to their sale in inter-
state or foreign commerce. §§ 3(a) and 4(a) of the 1947 Act, 
61 Stat. 166-167. The 1947 legislation also contained general 
standards setting forth the types of information necessary for 
proper labelling of a registered pesticide, including directions 
for use; warnings to prevent harm to people, animals, and 
plants; and claims made about the efficacy of the product. 
§§ 2(u)(2) and 3(a)(3). 
Upon request of the Secretary, the applicant was required 
to submit test data supporting the claims on the label, includ-
ing the formula for the pesticide. §§ 4(a) and (b). The 1947 
version of FIFRA specifically prohibited disclosure of "any 
information relative to formulas of products," §§ 3(c)(4) and 
8(c), but was silent with respect to the disclosure of any of 
the health and safety data submitted with an application. 3 
In 1970, the Department of Agriculture's FIFRA respon-
sibilities were transferred to the then newly created Envi-
2 The first federal legislation in this area was the Insecticide Act of 1910, 
36 Stat. 331, which made it unlawful to manufacture and sell insecticides 
that were adulterated or misbranded. In 1947, the 1910 legislation was 
repealed and replaced with FIFRA. 61 Stat. 172. 
Some States had undertaken to regulate pesticide use before there was 
federal legislation, and many more continued to do so after federal legisla-
tion was enacted. In 1946, the Council of State Governments recom-
mended for adoption a model state statute, the uniform State Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. See S. Rep. No. 92-838, p. 7 (1972); 
H. R. Rep. No. 313, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 3 (1947). 
3 Appellant here concedes, however, that as a matter of practice, the 
Department of Agriculture did not publicly disclose the health and safety 
information. Brief for Appellant 5, n. 5. 
., -
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ronmental Protection Agency, whose Administrator is the 
appellant in this case. See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 
1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623 (1970). 
Because of mounting public concern about the safety of 
pesticides and their effect on the environment and because of 
a growing perception that the existing legislation was not 
equal to the task qf safeguarding the public interest, see S. 
Rep. No. 92--838, at 3-9; S. Rep. No. 92-970, p. 9 (1972); 
H. R. Rep. No. 92-511, at 5-13, Congress undertook a com-
prehensive revision of FIFRA with tUi~~ the Fed-
eral Environmental Pesticide Contro ~ 86 Stat. ~ yd&:., 4 
973. The amendments transformed IFRA from a labelling ; . J -L. 
law into a comprehensive re~lato statute. H. R. Rep. /::).;-;-a:;,~ 
No. 92-511, at 1. As amended, FIFRA regulated the use, 
as well as the sale and labelling, of pesticides; regulated pes-
ticides produced and sold in both intrastate and interstate 
commerce; provided for review, cancellation, and suspension 
of registration; and gave EPA greater enforcement author-
ity. Congress also added a new criterion for re ·stration:}~ 
that EPA determine that the pes 1c1 e will not cause "unrea- ~ 
sonable adverse effects on the environment." §§ 3(c)(5)(C) ~/-
and (D), 86 Stat. 980-981. ~ -
For purposes of this litigation, the most significant of the ~;-, 
1972 amendments pertained to the pesticide-registration pro-
cedure and the public disclosure of information learned 
through that procedure. Congress added to FIFRA a new 
section governing public disclosure of data submitted in sup-
port of an application for registration. Under that section, 
the submitter of data could designate any portions of the sub-
mitted material it believed to be "trade secrets or commercial 
or financial information." § lO(a), 86 Stat. 989. Another 
section prohibited EPA from publicly disclosing information 
which, in its judgment, contained or related to "trade secrets 
or commercial or financial information." § l0(b). In the 
event that EPA disagreed with a submitter's designation of 
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cial information" and proposed to disclose that information, 
the original submitter could institute a declaratory judgment 
action in federal district court. § lO(c). 
The 1972 amendments also included a provision that al::, 
lowed EPA to consider data submitted by one a licant for 
regi~ n su port of another application pertaining to a ~ ~ 
similar chemica , prov1 e the su sequent ap licant offered 
to compensate the app cant w o originally submitted the 
data: § 3(cJ(l)(D). In effect, the provision instituted a man-
datory data-licensing scheme. The amount of compensation 
was to be negotiated by the parties, or, in the event negotia-
tions failed, was to be determined by EPA subject to judicial 
review upon the instigation of the original data submitter. 
The scope of the 1972 data-consideration provision, however, 
was limited, for any data designated as a "trade secret or 
commercial or financial information" exempt from disclosure 
under § 10 could not be considered at all by EPA to support 
another registration application unless the original submitter 
consented. Ibid. 
The 1972 amendments did not specify standards for the 
designation of submitted data as "trade secrets or commercial 
or financial information." In addition, Congress failed to 
designate an effective date for the data-consideration and dis-
closure schemes. In 1975, Congress amended § 3(c)(l)(D) toj 
provide that the data-consideration and data-disclosure pro-
visions applied only to data submitted on or after January 1, 
1970, 89 Stat. 755, but left the definitional question 
unanswered. 
Much litigation centered around the definition of "trade se-
cret or commercia o ncia i o ation" for the purposes 
of the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of 
FIFRA. EPA maintained that the exemption from consid-
eration or disclosure applied only to a narrow range of in-
formation , principally statements of formulae and manufac-
turing processes. In a series of lawsuits, however, 
data-submitting firms challenged EP A's interpretations and 
-
83--196--OPINION 
RUCKELSHAUS v. MONSANTO CO. 
-
5 
obtained several decisions to the effect that the term "trade 
secret" applied to any data, including health, safety, and 
environmental data, that met the definition of trade secret 
set forth in Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939). See, e. g., 
Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Castle, 447 F. Supp. 811 (WD Mo. 
1978); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Castle, 443 F. Supp. 1024 
(ND Cal. 1978). These decisions prevented EPA from dis-
closing much of the data on which it based its decision to reg-
ister pesticides and from considering the data submitted by 
one applicant in reviewing the application of a later applicant. 
See S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 7; H. R. Rep. No. 95-663, p. 18 
(1977). 
Because of these and other problems with the regulatory 
scheme embodied in FIFRA as amended in 1972, see S. Rep. 
No. 95-334, at 2-5; H. R. Rep. No. 95-663, at 15-21; see gen-
erally EPA Office of Pesticide Programs, FIFRA: Impact on 
the Industry (1977), reprinted in S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 
34-68, Congress enacted other amendments to FIFRA in 
1978. These were effected by the Federal Pesticide Act of 
1978, 92 Stat. 819. The new amendments included a series 
of revisions in the data-consideration and data-disclosure pro-
visions of FIFRA's §§ 3 and 10, 7 U. S. C. §§ 136a and 136h. 
Under FIFRA, as amended in 1978, applicants now are 
granted a 10-year p~use for data on new ac-
tive ingredients contained in pesticides registered after Sep-
tember 30, 1978. § 3(c)(l)(D)(i). All other data submitted 
after December 31, 1969, may be cited and considered in sup-
port of another application for 15 years after the original sub-
mission if the applicant offers to compensate the original 
submitter. § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii). 4 If the parties cannot agree on 
• § 3(c)(l)(D), 7 U. S. C. § 136a(c)(l)(D), reads in relevant part: 
"(D) ... 
"(i) With respect to pesticides containing active ingredients that are ini-
tially registered under this Act after September 30, 1978, data submitted 
to support the application for the original registration of the pesticide, or 
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the amount of compensation, either may initiate a binding ar-
bitration proceeding. The results of the arbitration proceed-
ing are not subject to judicial review, absent fraud or misrep-
resentation. The same statute provides that an original 
and that pertains solely to such new use, shall not, without the written per-
mission of the original data submitter, be considered by the Administrator 
to support an application by another person during a period of ten years 
following the date the Administrator first registers the pesticide ... 
"(ii) except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (D)(i) of this para-
graph, with respect to data submitted after December 31, 1969, by an ap-
plicant or registrant to support an application for registration, experimen-
tal use permit, or amendment adding a new use to an existing registration, 
to support or maintain in effect an existing registration, or for -reregistra-
tion, the Administrator may, without the permission of the original data 
submitter, consider any such item of data in support of an application by 
any other person ... within the fifteen-year period following the date the 
data were originally submitted only if the applicant has made an offer to 
compensate the original data submitter and submitted such offer to the Ad-
ministrator accompanied by evidence of delivery to the original data 
submitter of the offer. The terms and amount of compensation may be 
fixed by agreement between the original data submitter and the applicant, 
or, failing such agreement, binding arbitration under this subparagraph. 
If, at the end of ninety days after the date of delivery to the original data 
submitter of the offer to compensate, the original data submitter and the 
applicant have neither agreed on the amount and terms of compensation 
nor on a procedure for reaching an agreement on the amount and terms of 
compensation, either person may initiate binding arbitration proceedings 
by requesting the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to appoint an 
arbitrator from the roster of arbitrators maintained by such Service. . . . 
[T]he findings and determination of the arbitrator shall be final and conclu-
sive, and no official or court of the United States shall have power or juris-
diction to review any such findings and determination, except for fraud, 
misrepresentation, or other misconduct by one of the parties to the arbitra-
tion or the arbitrator where there is a verified complaint with supporting 
affidavits attesting to specific instances of such fraud , misrepresentation, 
or other misconduct. . . . If the Administrator determines that an original 
data submitter has failed to participate in a procedure for reaching an 
agreement or in an arbitration proceeding as required by this 
subparagraph, or failed to comply with the terms of an agreement or ar-
bitration decision concerning compensation under this subparagraph, the 
original data submitter shall forfeit the right to compensation for the use of 
- -
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submitter who refuses to participate in negotiations or in the 
arbitration proceeding forfeits his claim for compensation. 
Data that do not qualify for either the 10-year period of exclu-
sive use or the 15-year period of compensation may be consid-
ered by EPA without limitation. § 3(c)(l)(D)(iii). 
Also in 1978, Congress added a new subsection, § lO(d), 7 
U. ~h(d), that~ of all health, 
safet and environmental da a to q ........ u,,;;;,u re es ot-
withstanding the proh1 ition against disclosure of trade se-
crets contained in § lO(b). The statute, however, does not 
authorize disclosure of information that would reveal "manu-
facturing or quality control processes" or certain details 
about deliberately added inert ingredients unless "the Ad-
ministrator has first determined that the disclosure is neces-
sary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to 
health or the environment." §§ lO(d)(l)(A) to (C). 5 EPA 
the data in support of the application. . . . Registration action by the Ad-
ministrator shall not be delayed pending the fixing of compensation; 
"(iii) after expiration of any period of exclusive use and any period for 
which compensation is required for the use of an item of data under 
subparagraphs (D)(i) and (D)(ii) of this paragraph, the Administrator may 
consider such item of data in support of an application by any other appli-
cant without the permission of the original data submitter and without an 
offer having been received to compensate the original data submitter for 
the use of such item of data." 
• Section lO(d) reads in relevant part: 
"(1) All information concerning the objectives, methodology, results, or 
significance of any test or experiment performed on or with a registered or 
previously registered pesticide or its separate ingredients, impurities, or 
degradation products and any information concerning the effects of such 
pesticide on on any organism or the behavior of such pesticide in the envi-
ronment, including, but not limited to, data on safety to fish and wildlife, 
humans, and other mammals, plants, animals, and soil, and studies on per- -
sistence, translocation and fate in the environment, and metabolism, shall 
be available for disclosure to the public: Promded, That the use of such 
data for any registration purpose shall be governed by section 3 of this Act: 
Promdedfurther, That this paragraph does not authorize the disclosure of 
any information that-
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may not disclose data to representatives of foreign or multi-
national pesticide companies unless the original submitter of 
the data consents to the disclosure. § lO(g). Another sub-
section establishes a criminal penalty for wrongful disclosure 
by a government employee or contractor of confidential or 
trade secret data. § lO(f). 
II 
Appellee Monsanto Company (Monsanto) is an inventor, 
developer, and producer of various kinds of chemical prod-
ucts, including pesticides. Monsanto, headquartered in St. 
Louis County, Mo., sells in both domestic and foreign mar-
kets. It is one of a relatively small group of companies that 
invent and develop new active ingredients for pesticides and 
conduct most of the research and testing with respect to 
those ingredients. 6 
"(B) discloses the details of any methods for testing, detecting, or mea-
suring the quantity of any deliberately added inert ingredients of a pesti-
cide, or 
"(C) discloses the identity or percentage quantity of any deliberately 
added inert ingredient of a pesticide, 
unless the Administrator has first determined that disclosure is necessary 
to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the 
environment. 
"(2) Information concerning production, distribution, sale, or inven-
tories of a pesticide that is otherwise entitled to confidential treatment 
under subsection (b) of this section may be publicly disclosed in connection 
with a public proceeding to determine whether a pesticide, or any ingredi-
ent of a pesticide, causes unreasonable adverse effects on health or the 
environment, if the Administrator determines that such disclosure is nec-
essary to the public interest." 
6 A study by the Office of Pesticide Programs of the EPA showed that in 
1977 approximately 400 firms were registered to produce manufacturing-
use products. S. Rep. No. 95-334, p. 34 (1977). It was estimated that 
the 10 largest firms account for 75% of this country's pesticide production. 
Id., at 60. A correspondingly small number of new pesticides are mar-
keted each year. In 1974, only 10 new pesticides were introduced. See 
Goring, The Costs of Commercializing Pesticides, International Confer-
ence of Entomology, Aug. 20, 1976, reprinted in Hearings on Extension of 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Before the Sub-
-
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These active ingredients are sometimes referred to as 
"manufacturing-use products" because they are not generally 
sold directly to users of pesticides. Rather, they must first 
be combined with "inert ingredients" -chemicals that dis-
solve, dilute, or stabilize the active components. The results 
of this process are sometimes called "end-use products," and 
the firms that produce end-use products are called "formu-
lators." See the opinion of the District Court in this case, 
Monsanto Co. v. Acting Administrator, United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 564 F. Supp. 552 554 (ED 
Mo. 1983). A firm that produces an active ingredien may 
use it for incorporation into its own o uc , may 
sell it to formulators, or may do both. Monsanto produces / 
both active ingredients and end-use products. Ibid. 
The District Court found that development of a potential 
commercial pesticide candidate typically requires the expen-
diture of $5 million to $15 million annually for several years. 
The development process may take between 14 and 22 years, 
and it is usually that long before a company can expect any 
return on its investment. Id., at 555. For every manufac-
turing-use pesticide the average company finally markets, it 
will have screened and tested 20,000-others. · Monsanto has a 




markets one out of every 10,000 chemicals tested. Ibid. 
Monsanto, like any other applicant for registration of a pes-
ticide, must present research and test data supporting its 
application. The District Court found that Monsanto had in-A 
curred costs in excess of $23. 6 million in develo ing th!' ( 2-s . , 
health, safety, and environmenta ata u rmtted by it under 
· IF A. . , a e 1 orma 10n submitted with one 
application usually has value to Monsanto beyond its instru-
mentality in gaining that particular application. Monsanto 
uses this information to develop additional end-use products 
committee on Agriculture Research and General Legislation of the Senate 
Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. , 
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and to expand the uses of its registered products. The in-
formation would also be valuable to Monsanto's competitors. 
For that reason, Monsanto has instituted stringent security 
measures to ensure the secrecy of the data. Ibid. 
It is this health, safety, and environmental data that ,(j- C: 
Monsanto sought to protect by bringing this suit. The Dis-
trict Court found that much of this data "contains or relates 
to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of Torts and 
Confidential, commercial information." Id. , at 562. 
Monsanto brought suit in District Court, seeking injunc-
tive and declaratory relief from the operation of the data-con-
sideration provisions of FIFRA's § 3(c)(l)(D), and the data-
disclosure provisions of FIFRA's § 10, and the related 
§ 3(c)(2)(A). Monsanto alleged that all of the challenged pro-
visions effected a "taking" of property without just com-
pensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In addition, 
Monsanto alleged that the data-consideration provisions vio-
lated the Amendment because they effected a taking of prop-
erty for a private, rather than a public, purpose. Finally, 
Monsanto alleged that the arbitration scheme provided by 
§ 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) violates the original submitter's due process 
rights and constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judi-
cial power. 
After a bench trial, the District Court concluded that 
Monsanto possessed ' property ~ igh{; in it~ submitted data, 
specifically including the right to exclude others from the en-
joyment of such data by preventing its unauthorized use and 
by prohibiting its disclosure. 564 F. Supp. , at 566. The 
court found that the challenged data-consideration provisions 
"give Monsanto's competitors a free ride at Monsanto's ex-
pense." Ibid. The District Court reasoned that § 3(c)(l)(D) 
appropriated Monsanto's fundamental right to exclude, and 
that the effect of that appropriation is substantial. The 
court further found that Monsanto's property was being ap-
propriated for a private purpose and that this interference 
-
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was much more significant than the public good that the 
appropriation might serve. 564 F. Supp., at 566--567. 
The District Court also found that operation of the disclo- Lf < _ d-
sure provisions of FIFRA constituted a taking of Monsanto's '~ /~ ~ 
property. The cost incurred by Monsanto when its property -- - - r ( 
is "permanently committed to the public domain and thus ef-
fectively destroyed" was viewed by the District Court as sig-
nificantly outweighing any benefit to the general public from 
having the ability to scrutinize the data, for the court seemed 
to believe that the general public could derive all the assur-
ance it needed about the safety and effectiveness of a pesti-
cide from EP A's decision to register the product and to ap-
prove the label. Id., at 567 and n. 4. 
After finding that the data-consideration provisions oper- ~ ~ 
ated to effect a taking of property, the District Court found 
that the compulsory binding-arbitration scheme set forth in 
§ 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) did not adequately provide com ensa 10n r 
the property taken. he court foun he arbitration provi-
sion to be arbitrary and vague, reasoning that the statute 
does not give arbitrators guidance as to the factors that enter 
into the concept of just compensation, and that judicial re-
view is foreclosed except in cases of fraud. Id. , at 567. The 
District Court also found that the arbitration scheme was in-
firm because it did not meet the requirements of Article III 
of the Constitution. Ibid. Finally, the court found that a 
remedy under the Tucker Act was not available for the depri-
vations of property effected by §§ 3 and 10. 564 F. Supp. , at 
567-568. 
The District Court therefore declared §§ 3(c)(l)(D), 
3(c)(2)(A), lO(b), and lO(d) of FIFRA, as amended b the 
Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, to be cons 1tutional, nd 
permanently enjoined EPA from implemen mg ore orcing 
those sections. See Amended Judgment, App. to Juris. 
Statement 41a. 
Because the decision of the District Court so severely un-
dermines the statutory scheme envisioned by Congress for 
~r 
~r4 
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the regulation of pesticide sale and use and because the deci-
sion conflicts with the holdings of other federal courts, 7 we 
noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1983). 
III 
In deciding this case~ are faced with four questions: (1) 
Does Monsanto have ~ petly in~e~ st protected by the 
Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause in the health, safety, and 
environmental data it has submitted to EPA? (2) If so, does 
EP A's use of the data to evaluate the applications of others or 
~p A's ~ s~e of the data to qua~ified members of the P?b-
lic effe~ king of tha~ operty mterest? (3) If there 1s a 
taking, 1s it'ata'king fqf).,public use? (4) If there is a taking 
or a public use, does the statute 'adequately provide for just 
~ ? . 
For purposes of this case, appellant has stipulated that 
"Monsanto has certain property rights in its information, re-
search and test data that it has submitted under FIFRA to 
EPA and its predecessor agencies which may be protected by 
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States. " App. 36. Since the exact import of that stipulation 
is not clear, we address the question whether the dat a at 
issue here can be considered property for the purposes of the 
Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
This Court never has squarely addressed the applicability 
of the protections of the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment to commercial data of the kind involved in this case. In 
answering the question now, we are mindful of the basic ax-
iom that " '[p]roperty interests .. . are not created by the 
Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions 
are defined by existing' rules or understandings that stem 
1 See, e. g., Petrolite Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, 519 F . Supp. 966 (DC 1981); Mobay Chemical Corp. v. Castle, 517 
F. Supp. 252, and 517 F . Supp. 254 (WD Pa. 1981), aff 'd sub nom. Mobay 
Chemical Co . v. Gorsuch, 682 F . 2d 419 (CA3), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 988 
(1982); Chevron Chemical Co. v. Castle, 499 F. Supp. 732, (Del. 1980), 
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from an independent source such as state law."' Webb's 
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U. S. 155, 161 
(1980), quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 577 
(1972). Monsanto asserts that the health, safety, and envi-
ronmental data it has submitted to EPA are property under 
Missouri law, which recognizes trade secrets, as defined in 
§ 757, Comment b, of the Restatement of Torts, as property. 
See Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Lemay Valve Co., 354 S. W. 2d 913, 
917 (Mo. App. 1962); Harrington v. National Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 355 Mo. 524, 532, 196 S. W. 2d 786, 791 (1946); 
Luckett v. Orange Julep Co., 271 Mo. 289, 302-304, 196 
S. W. 740, 743 (1917). The Restatement defines a trade se-
cret as "any formula, pattern, ev1ce or comp1 a 10 of in-
forination which is used in one's business, and which gives 
him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors 
who do not know or use it." § 757, Comment b. And the 
parties have stipulated that much of the information, re-
search, and test data that Monsanto has submitted under 
FIFRA to EPA "contains or relates to trade secrets as de-
fined by the Restatement of Torts." App. 36. 
Because of the intangible nature of a trade secret, the ex-
tent of the property right therein is defined by the extent to 
which the owner of the secret protects his interest from dis-
closure to others. See Harrington, supra; Reddi-Wip, 
supra; Restatement of Torts, supra; see also Kewanee Oil 
Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U. S. 470, 474-476 (1974). In-
formation that is public knowledge or that is generally known 
in an industry cannot be a trade secret. Restatement of 
Torts, supra. If an individual discloses his trade secret to 
others who are under no obligation to protect the confiden-
tiality of the information, or otherwise publicly discloses the 
secret, his property right is extinguished. See Harrington, 
supra; R. Milgrim, Trade Secrets, § 1.01[2] (1983). 
Trade secrets have man of the characteristics of more tan- 'fe.t__ 
gible orms o property. Thus, a tra e secret 1s assignable. (} 
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Co., 220 U. S. 373, 401-402 (1911); Painton & Co. v. Bourns, 
Inc., 442 F. 2d 216, 225 (CA21971). A trade secret can form 
the res of a trust, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 82, Com-
ment e (1959); 1 A. Scott, Law of Trusts § 82.5, p. 703 (3d ed. 
1967), and it passes to a trustee in bankruptcy. See In re 
Uniservices, Inc ., 517 F. 2d 492, 496-497 (CA7 1975). 
Even the manner in which Congress referred to trade se-
crets in the legislative history of FIFRA supports the gen-
eral perception of their property-like nature. In discussing 
the 1978 amendments to FIFRA, Congress recognized that 
data developers like Monsanto have a "proprietary interest" 
in their data. S. Rep. No. 95-334, at 31. Further, Con-
gress reasoned that submitters of data are "entitled" to "com-
pensation" because they "have legal ownership of their data." 
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1560, p. 29 (1978). 8 This general 
perception of trade secrets as property is consonant with a 
notion of "property" that extends beyond land and tangible 
goods and includes the products of an individual's "labour and 
invention." 2 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, *405; see gen-
erally J. Locke, The Second Treatise of Civil Government, 
ch. 5 (J. Gough ed. 1947). 
Although this Court never has squarely addressed the 
question whether a person can have a property interest in a 
trade secret, which is admittedly intangible, we have found 
other kinds of intangible interests to be property for pur-
>ses o e t m m a · g e. ee, e.g., 
Armstrong v. -United States, 364 U. S. 40, 44, 46 (1960) 
(materialman's lien provided for under Maine law protected 
by Taking Clause); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. 
Radford, 295 U. S. 555, 59~02 (1935) (real estate lien pro-
tected); Lynch v. United States, 292 U. S. 571, 579 (1934) 
(valid contracts are property within meaning of the Taking 
8 Of course, it was not necessary that Congress recognize the data at 
issue here as property in order for it to be protected by the Taking Clause. 
We mention the legislative history merely as one more illustration of the 
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Clause). That intangible property rights protected by state 
law are deserving of the protection of the Taking Clause has 
long been implicit in the thinking of this Court: 
"It is conceivable that [the term "property'' in the Tak-
ing Clause] was used in its vulgar and untechnical sense 
of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen ex-
ercises rights recognized by law. On the other hand, it 
may have been employed in a more accurate sense to de-
note the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation 
to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dis-
pose of it. In point of fact, the construction given the 
phrase has been the latter." United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373, 377-378 (1945). 
We therefore hold that to the extent that Monsanto has an 
interest in its heafth et and environme~ - a_ ~ r21Pvr 
z~a rade-secret property right un er Missouri law, 
that property right is pro ecte oy t e Taking Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 9 
• Contrary to EPA's contention, Brief for Appellant 29, Justice Holmes' 
dictum in E.I. duPont de Nemours Powder Co . v. Masland, 244 U. S. 100 
(1917), does not undermine our holding that a trade secret is property pro-
tected by the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause. Masland arose from a 
dispute about the disclosure of trade secrets during preparation for a trial. 
In his opinion for the Court, the Justice stated: 
"The case has been considered as presenting a conflict between a right of 
property and a right to make a full defense, and it is said that if the disclo-
sure is forbidden to one who denies that there is a trade secret, the merits 
of his defense are adjudged against him before he has a chance to be heard 
or to prove his case. We approach the question somewhat differently. 
The word 'property' as applied to trade-marks and trade secrets is an un-
analyzed expression of certain secondary consequences of the primary fact 
that the law makes some rudimentary requirements of good faith. 
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not the defendant knows 
the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence that he ac-
cepted. The property may be denied but the confidence cannot be. 
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due 
process of law, but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with 
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Having determined that Monsanto has a pro2..,erty ~~est 
in the data it has submitted to EPA, we corifront the cult 
question whether a "taking" will occur when EPA discloses 
that data or considers the data in evaluating another applica-
tion for registration. The question of what constitutes a 
"taking" is one with which this Court has wrestled on many 
occasions. It has never been the rule that only govern-
mental acquisition or destruction of the property of an indi-
vidual constitutes a taking,- for 
"courts have held that the deprivation of the former 
owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to 
the sovereign constitutes the taking. Governmental ac-
tion short of acquisition of title or occupancy has been 
held, if its effects are so complete as to deprive the 
owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, 
to amount to a taking." United States v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 323 U. S., at 378. 
See also PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U. S. 74 
(1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 
(1922). 
As has been admitted on numerous occasions, "this Court 
has generally 'been unable to develop any "set formula" for 
de ermmmg when JUS ice an a1rness reqmre th~ eco-
nomic mJur1es causea15ypu@ic acfionrn must be deemed a 
compensable taking. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U. S. 164, 175 (1979), quoting Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City, 438 U. S. 104, 124 (1978); accord, 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reel. Assn., 452 
U. S. 264, 295 (1981). The Court, however, has identified 
Justice Holmes did not deny the existence of a property interest; he simply 
deemed determination of the existence of that interest irrelevant to resolu-
tion of the case. In a case decided prior to Mas land, the Court had spoken 
of trade secrets in property terms. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & 
Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250--253 (1905) (Holmes, J. for the Court). See 
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·everal factors( that should be taken into account when deter-
~er a governmental action has gone beyond 
"regula~' and effects a "taking." Among tho actors 
are: "th'e-'-charac~of the governmental ac 10n, 1 onomic 
impact, and i~ terference with reasonable investment-
backed expectations." PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U. S., at 83; see Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 175; 
Penn Central, 438 U. S., at 124. It is to the last of these 
three factors that we now direct our attention, for we find 
that the force of this factor is so overwhelming, at least with 
respect to certainoftlie data submitted by Monsanto to 
EPA, that it disposes of the taking question with respect to 
that data. 
A 
A "reasonable investment-backed expectation" must be 
more than a "unilateral expectation or an abstract need." 
Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, 449 U. S., at 161. We find 
that with respect to any health, safety, and environmental 
data that Monsanto submitted to EPA after the effective 
date of the 1978 FIFRA amendments-that is, on or after 
October 1, 1978 10-Monsanto could not have had a reason- , 
able, investment-backed expectation that EPA would keep 
the data confidential beyond_ the limits prescribed in the 
amended statute itself. "Monsanto was then on notice of the 
a~ A was authorized to use and disclose any 
data turned over to it by an applicant for registration. 
Thus, with respect to any data submitted to EPA on or 
after October , , onsan ew a , or a period of 10 
ye~ of submission, EPA, without Monsanto's 
permission, would not consider that data in evaluating the 
application of another. § 3(c)(l)(D)(i). It was also aware, 
however, that once the 10-year period had expired, EPA 
could use the data . without Monsanto's permission. 
10 The Federal Pesticide Act of 1978 was approved on September 30, 
1978. 92 Stat. 842. The new data-consideration and data-disclosure pro-






RUCKELSHAUS v. MONSANTO CO. 
-
§§ 3(c)(l)(D)(ii) and (iii). Monsanto was further aware that it 
was entitled to an offer of compensation from the subsequent 
applicant only until the end of the fifteenth year from the 
date of submission. § 3(c)(l)(D)(iii). In addition, Monsanto 
was aware that information relating to formulae of products 
could be revealed by EPA to "any Federal agency consulted 
and [could] be revealed at a public hearing or in findings of 
fact" issued by EPA "when necessary to carry out" EP A's 
duties under FIFRA. § lO(b). The statute also gave I 
Monsanto notice that much of the health, safety, and efficacy ? 
data provided by it could be disclosed to the general public at 
any time. § lO(d). If, despite the data-consideration and 
data-disclosure provisions in the statute, Monsanto chose to 
submit the requisite data in order to receive a registration, it 
can hardly argue that its reasonable investment-backed 
expectations are disturbed when EPA acts to use or disclose 
the data in a manner that was authorized by law at the time 
of the submission. 
Monsanto argues that the statute's requirement that a 
submitter give up its property interest in the data constitutes 
placing an unconstitutional condition on the right to a valu-
able government benefit. See Brief for Appellee 29. But 
Monsanto has not challenged the ability of the Federal Gov-
ernment to regulate the marketing and use of pesticides. 
Nor could Monsanto successfully make such a challenge, for 
such restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in ex-
change for "'the advantage of living and doing business in a 
civilized community."' Andrus v. Allard, 444 U. S. 51, 67 
(1979), quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 
393, 422 (1922) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see Day-Brite 
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U. S. 421, 424 (1952). This 
is particularly true in an area, such as pesticide sale and use, 
that has long been the source of public concern and the sub-
ject of government regulation. That Monsanto is willing to 
bear this burden in exchange for the ability to market pesti-
cides in this country is evidenced by the fact that it has con-
-
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tinued to expand its research and development and submit 
data to EPA despite the enactment of the 1978 amendments 
to FIFRA. 11 564 F. Supp., at 561. 
Thus, as long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions under 
which the data are submitted, and the conditions are ration-
ally related to a legitimate government interest, a voluntary 
submission of data by an applicant in exchange for the eco-
nomic advantages of a registration can hardly be called a tak-
ing. See Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U. S. 
427, 431-432 (1919) ("The right of a manufacturer to maintain 
secrecy as to his compounds and processes must be held sub-
ject to the right of the State, in the exercise of its police 
power and in promotion of fair dealing, to require that the na-
ture of the product be fairly set forth"); see also Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, 555 F. 2d 82, 95 (CA3 1977). 
B 
Prior to the 1972 amendments, FIFRA was silent with re-
spect to EP A's authorized use and disclosure of data submit-
ted to it in connection with an application for registration. 
Another statute, the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1905, 
however, arguably is relevant. That Act is a general crimi-
nal statute that provides a penalty for any employee of the 
United States Government who discloses, in a manner not 
authorized by law, any trade secret information that is re-
vealed to him during the course of his official duties. This 
Court has determined that § 1905 is more than an "antileak" 
statute aimed at deterring government employees from prof-
iting by information they receive in their official capacities. 
See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U. S. 281, 298-301 (1979). 
11 Because the market for Monsanto's pesticide products is an interna-
tional one, Monsanto could decide to forgo registration in the United States 
and sell a pesticide only in foreign markets. Presumably, it will do so in 
those situations where it deems the data to be protected from disclosure 
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Rather, § 1905 also applies to formal agency action, i. e., ac-
tion approved by the agency or department head. Ibid. 
It is true that, prior to the 1972 amendments, neither 
FI RA nor any other provis10n o law gave EPA authority to 
disclose data obtamed from onsanto. ut t e a e Se-
crets ct 1s not a guaran ee o con dentiality to submitters of 
data, and, absent an express promise, Monsanto had no rea-
sonable, inv~ation that its information 
wou remam mv10 ate m tlie an o ~ustry 
that ong has een e cus o gr pu ·c concern and sig-
nificant government regulation, the possibility was substan-
tial that the Federal Government, which had thus far taken 
~4, 
/ 7 72 
no position on disclosure of health, safety, and environmental 
data concerning pesticides, upon focusing on the issue, would 
find disclosure to be in the public interest. Thus, with re-
spect to data submitted to EPA in connection with an applica-, 
tion for registration prior to October 22, 1972, 12 the Trade Se-
crets Act provided no basis for a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation that data submitted to EPA 




A fortiori, the Trade Secrets Act cannot be construed as 
any sort of assurance against internal agency use of submit-
ted data during consideration of the application of a subse-
quent applicant for registration. 13 Indeed, there is some evi- l 
dence that the practice of using data submitted by one 
company during c~pplication of a subse-
quent applicant was widesErea~ and well known. 14 Thus, 
12 The 1972 amendments to FIFRA became effective at the close of the 
business day on October 21, 1972. 86 Stat. 998. 
13 The Trade Secrets Act prohibits a government employee from ''pub-
lish[ing], divulg[ing], disclos[ing] or mak[ing] known" confidential informa-
tion received in his official capacity. 18 U. S. C. § 1905. In considering ( 
the data of one applicant in connection with the application of another, 
EPA does not violate any of these prohibitions. 
14 The District Court found: "During the period that USDA administered 
FIFRA, it was also its policy that the data developed and submitted by 
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with respect to any data that Monsanto submitted to EPA 
prior to the e ective date of the 1972 amendments to 
FIFRA, we hol that Monsanto could not have had a "reason-
able investment-backed expectation" tha would main-
tam a a m s r1c est con ence an would use it exclu-
- purpose o consi ering the onsanto 
w ch the data were 
of another's product without the permission of the data submitter." 564 
F. Supp., at 564 (emphasis in original). The District Court apparently 
based this finding on the testimony of two former Directors of the Pesticide / 4' 
7 
z._, 
Regulation Division, who testified that they knew of no instance in which 
data submitted by one applicant was subsequently considered in evaluating 
another application. Ibid. 
This finding is in marked conflict with the statement of the National Ag-
ricultural Cherrueals Associat1oli';presented before a Senate subcommittee 
in 1972, which advocated that the 1972 amendments to FIFRA should con-
tain an exclusive-use provision: 
"Under the present law registration information submitted to the Adminis-
trator has not routinely been made available for public inspection. Such 
information has, however, a~ tice but without statutory au-
thority, been considered by the Administrator to sup~~3 tration 
of the sameorasiimrarpfocluctoyanofnerregistran[" Federal E nvircin-
men~rdDrcf:Heafffigs Berofethe Subcommittee on Agri-
cultural Research and General Legislation of the Senate Committee on Ag-
riculture and Forestry, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. , pt. II, p. 245 (1972). 
In addition, EPA points to the Department of Agriculture's Interpretation 
with Respect to Warning, Caution and Antidote Statements Required to 
Appear on Labels of Economic Poisons, 27 Fed. Reg. 2267 (1962), which 
presents a list of pesticides that would require no additional toxicological 
data for registration. The clear implication from the Interpretation is that 
the Department determined that the data already submitted with respect 
to those chemicals would be sufficient for purposes of evaluating any future 
applications for registration with respect to those chemicals. ( 
Although the evidence against the District Court's finding seems over- 2' 
whelming, we need not determine that the finding was clearly erroneous in 
order to find that a submitter had no reasonable expectation that the De-
partment or EPA would not use the data it had submitted when evaluating 
the application of another. The District Court did not find that the policy 
of the Department was publicly known at the time or that there was any 
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The situation is different, however, with respect to data ,, 1 
submitted by Monsanto to EPA during the period from Octo- ' ~ 
her 22, 1972, through Septem er 30 1978. Un er the statu-  
tory scheme then m e ect, a submitter was given an opportu-
nity to protect its trade secrets from disclosure by '--L ~ 
designating them as trade secrets at the time of submission. 
When Monsanto provided data to EPA during this period, it 
was with the understanding, embodied in FIFRA, that EPA 
was free to use any of the submitted data that was not a trade 
secret in considering the application of another, provided that 
EPA required the subsequent applicant to pay "reasonable 
compensation" to the original submitter. § 3(c)(l)(D), 86 
Stat. 979. But the statute also gave Monsanto explicit as-
surance that EPA was prohibited from disclosing publicly, or 
considering in connection with the application of another, any 
data submitted by an applicant if both the applicant and EPA 
determined the data to be a trade secret. § 10, 86 Stat. 989. 
Thus, with respect to trade secrets submitted under the stat-
utory regime in force between the time of the adoption of the 
1972 amendments and the adoption of the 1978 amendments, 
the Federal Government had explicitly guaranteed to 
Monsanto and other registration applicants an extensive 
measure of confidentiality and exclusive use with respect to 
their trade secrets. This explicit governmental guarantee 
formed the basis of a reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tion. If EPA, consistent with the authority granted it by 
the 1978 FIFRA amendments, were now to disclose trade-se-
cret data or consider that data in evaluating the application of 
a subsequent applicant in a manner not authorized by the 
version of FIFRA in effect between 1972 and 1978, EP A's ac-
tions would frustrate Monsanto's reasonable investment-
backed expectation with respect to its control over the use 
and dissemination of the data it had submitted. 
- -
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The right to exclude others is generally "one of the most 
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly 
characterized as property." Kaiser Aetna, 444 U. S., at 
176. With respect to a trade secret, the right to exclude oth-
ers is central to the very definition of the property interest. 
Once the data that constitutes a trade secret is disclosed to 
others, or others are allowed to use that data, the holder of 
the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data. 
That the data retain usefulness for Monsanto even after they 
are disclosed-for example, as bases from which to develop 
new products or refine old products, as marketing and ad-
vertising tools, or as information necessary to obtain reg-
istration in foreign countries-is irrelevant to the determina-
tion of the economic impact of the EPA action on Monsanto's 
property right. The economic value of that property right 
lies in the competitive advantage over others that Monsanto 
enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data, and disclo-
sure or use by others of the data would destroy that competi-
tive edge. 
Appellant encourages us to view the situation not as a tak-
ing of Monsanto's property interest in the trade secrets, but 
as a "pre-emption" of whatever property rights Monsanto 
may have had in the trade secrets. Brief for Appellant 
27-28. The agency argues that the proper functioning of the 
comprehensive FIFRA registration scheme depends upon its 
uniform application to all data. Thus, it is said, the Suprem-
acy Clause dictates that the scheme not vary depending on 
the property law of the State in which the submitter is lo-
cated. Id., at 28. This argument proves too much. If 
Congress can "pre-empt" state property law in the manner 
advocated by EPA, then the Taking Clause has lost all vital-
ity. This Court has stated that a sovereign, "by ipse dixit, 
may not transform private property into public property 
without compensation . . . . This is the very kind of thing 
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prevent." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beck-with, 
449U~~-
In um~,-we hold that EP A's consideration or disclo-
sure of data subrmttea y onsan o o t e a ency prior to 
Octo~2,o~978,d~snot~ect 
a taking. We further hold that ~PA consideration or disclo-
sure of health, safety, and environmental data will constitute 
a taking if Mons nto submitted the data to EPA between'Oc-
tober 22, 1972, and e tern er 9 ; e ata constituted 
a tra e secret under ssouri law; Monsanto had designated 
the data to be a trade secret at the time of its submission; and 
the use or disclosure conflicts with the explicit assurance of 
confidentiality or exclusive use contained in the statute d 
ing that period. 15 
V 
We must next consider whether any taking of private prop-
erty that may occur by operation of the data-disclosure and 
data-consideration provisions of FIFRA is a taking for a 
"public use." We have recently stated that the scope of the 
"public use" requirement of the Taking Clause is "coterminus 
with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." Hawaii 
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, -- U.S.--, -- (1984) 
(slip op. 10); see Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 (1954). 
The role of the courts in second-guessing the legislature's 
judgment of what constitutes a public use is extremely nar-
row. Midkiff, supra; Berman, supra, at 32. 
The District Court found that EP A's action pursuant to the 
data-consideration provisions of FIFRA would effect a taking 
for a private use, rather than a public use, because such ac-
tion benefits subsequent applicants by forcing original 
15 While the 1975 amendments to FIFRA purported to carry backward 
the protections against data consideration and data disclosure to submis-
sions of data made on or after January 1, 1970, 89 Stat. 751, the relevant 
consideration for our purposes is the nature of the expectations of the 
submitter at the time the data was submitted. We therefore do not ex-
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submitters to share their data with later applicants. 564 F. 
Supp., at 566. It is true that the most direct beneficiaries of 
EPA actions under the data-consideration provisions of 
FIFRA will be the later applicants who will support their 
applications by citation to data submitted by Monsanto or 
some other original submitter. Because of the data-consid-
eration provisions, later applicants will not have to replicate 
the sometimes intensive and complex research necessary to 
produce the requisite data. This Court, however, has re-
jected the notion that a use is a public use only if the property 
taken is put to use for the general public. Midkiff, --
U. S., at -- (slip op. 13); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 
U. S. 700, 707 (1923); Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 155 
(1921). t- \ \ 
So long as the takin has a cbnceivable ublic character, I 
"the means y which it will e attained is . . . or ongress to 
determine." Berman, 348 U. S., at 33. Here, the public 
purpose behind the data-consideration provision is cf ear from 
the legislative history. Congress believed that the provi-
sions would eliminate costly duplication of research and 
streamline the registration process, making new end-use 
products available to consumers more quickly. Allowing ap-
plicants for registration, upon payment of compensation, to 
use data already accumulated by otn'ers, ratnr!r tna:ri£orcing 
them to go through the time-consuming process of repeating 
the research, would eliminate a significant barrier to entry 
into the pesticide market, thereby allowing greater compe-
tition among producers of end-use products. S. Rep. No. 
95-334, at 30-31, 40-41; 124 Cong. Rec. 29756-29757 (1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Leahy). Such a procompetitive purpose is 
well within the police power of Congress. See Midkiff, --
U.S., at-- (slip op. 11-12). 16 
16 Monsanto argues that EPA and, by implication, Congress misappre-
hended the true "barriers to entry'' in the pesticide industry and that the 
challenged provisions of the law create, rather than reduce, barriers to en-
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Because the data-disclosure provisions of FIFRA provide 
for disclosure to the general public, the District Court did not 
find that those provisions constituted a taking for a private 
use. Instead, the court found that the data-disclosure provi-
sions served no use. It reasoned that because EPA before 
registration must determine that a product is safe and effec-
tive, and because the label on a pesticide, by statute, must 
set forth the nature, contents, and purpose of the pesticide, 
the label provided the public with all the assurance it needed 
that the product is safe and effective. 564 F. Supp., at 567 
and n. 4. It is enough for us to state that the optimum 
amount of disclosure to the public is for Congress, not the 
courts, to decide, and that the statute embodies Congress' 
judgment on that question. See 123 Cong. Rec., at 25756 
(remarks of Sen. Leahy). We further observe, however, ! 
that public disclosure can provide an effective check on the 
decisionmaking processes of EPA and allows members of the 7 
public to determine the likelihood of individualized risks pe-
culiar to their use of the product. See H. R. Rep. No. 
9fr-343, at 8 (remarks of Douglas M. Costle); S. Rep. No. 
9fr-334, at 13. 
We therefore hold that any taking of private property that 
may occur in connection with EP A's use or disclosure of data 
submitted to it by Monsanto between October 22, 1972, and 
September 30, 1978, is a taking for a public use. -------VI 
Equitable relief is not available to enjoin an alleged taking 
of private property for a public use, duly authorized by law, 17 
directed to Congress. The proper inquiry before this Court is not whether 
the provisions in fact will accomplish their stated objectives. Our review 
is limited to determining that the purpose is legitimate and that Congress 
rationally could have believed that the provisions would promote that ob-
jective. Midkiff, - - U. S., at -- (slip op. 12); Western & Southern 
Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648, 671-672 (1981). 
17 Any taking of private property that would occur as a result of EPA 
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when a suit for compensation can be brought against the sov-
ereign subsequent to the taking. Larson v. Domestic & 
Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U. S. 682, 697, n. 18 (1949). 
The Fifth Amendment does not require that compensation 
precede the taking. Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 104 
(1932). Generally, an individual claiming that the United 
States has taken his property can seek just compensation 
under the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491. 18 United States v. 
Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 (1946) ("If there is a taking, the 
claim is 'founded upon the Constitution' and within the juris-
diction of the Court of Claims to hear and determine"); 
Yearsley v. Ross Construction Co., 309 U. S. 18, 21 (1940). 
In this case, however, the District Court enjoined EPA ac- .)}c ~ tion under the data-consideration and data-disclosure provi-
sions of · FIFRA, finding that a Tucker Act remedy is not 
available for any taking of property that may occur as a result 
of the operation of those provisions. W '} do not a£!ee with 
the District Court's assessment that no Tucker Act remedy 
will lie for whatever taking may occur due to EPA activity 
pursuant to FIFRA. 
In determining whether a Tucker Act remedy is available 
for claims arising out of a taking pursuant to a federal stat-
ute, the ~roper ~~ is not whether the statute "expresses 
an affirmative s owmg of congressional int nt to permit re-
course o a ucker c remedy, "wh~ has 
in the [statute] ujthdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdic-
tion to the -C-ourt of Claims to hear a smt involving the [stat-
uteT 'founded ... upon the Constitution." ' Regional Rail 
ber 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978, is, of course, duly authorized by 
FIFRA as amended in 1978. 
18 The Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. § 1491, reads, in relevant part: 
"The United States Claims Court shall have jurisdiction to render judg-
ment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the 
Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive de-
partment, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, 
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Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S. 102, 126 (1974) (empha-
sis in original). 
Now here in FIFRA or in its legislative history is there dis-
cussion of the interaction between FIFRA and the Tucker 
Act. Since the Tucker Act grants what is now the Claims 
Court "jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim 
against the United States founded ... upon the Constitu-
tion," we would have to infer a withdrawal of jurisdiction 
with respect to takings under FIFRA from the structure of 
the statute or from its legislative history. A withdrawal of 
jurisdiction would amount to a partial repeal of the Tucker 
Act. This Court has recognized, however, that "repeals by J 
implication are disfavored." Regional Rail Reorganization 
Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 133. See, e.g., Amell v. United 
States, 384 U. S. 158, 165-166 (1966); Mercantile National 
Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U. S. 555, 565 (1963); United States 
v. Borden Co., 308 U. S. 188, 198-199 (1939). 
Monsanto argues that FIFRA's provision that an original 
submitter of data w1iq fails to participate in a procedure for 
reaching an agreement or"in an arbitration proceeding, or 
fails to comply with the terms of an agreement or arbitration 
decision, "shall forfeit the right to compensation for the use of 
the data in support of the application," § 3(c)(l)(D)(ii), indi-
cates Congress' intent that there be no Tucker Act remedy. 
But where two statutes are "'capable of co-existence, it is the 
duty of the courts, absent a cfearly expressed congressional 
intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."' Re-
gional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 133-134, 
quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974). 
) 
H~e, co12_trary to Monsanto's claim, it is ent~el~ossible for 
the Tucker Act and F'IFRA to co-exist. T e etter inter-
pretation, therefore, of the F'IF'.RA fanguage on forfeiture, 
which gives force to both the Tucker Act and the FIFRA pro-
vision, is to read FIFRA as implementing an exhaustion re-
quire s recon i 10n o a c er ct c aim. That is, 
FIFRA does not withdraw the possi ility of a Tucker Act 
-
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remedy, but merely requires that a claimant first seek sat-
isfaction through the statutory procedure. Cf. Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 154-156 (view-
ing Tucker Act remedy as covering any shortfall between 
statutory remedy and just compensation). 
With respect to data disclosure to the general public, 
FIFRA provides for no compensation whatsoever. Thus, 
Monsanto's argument that Congress intended the compensa-
tion scheme provided in FIFRA to be exclusive has no rele-
vance to the data-disclosure provisions of§ 10. 
Congress in FIFRA did not address the liability of the 
Government to pay just compensation should a taking occur. 
Congress' failure -specifically to mention or provide for re-
course against the Government may reflect a congressional 
belief that use of data by EPA in the ways authorized by 
FIFRA effects no Fifth Amendment taking or it may reflect 
Congress' assumption that the general grant of jurisdiction 
under the Tucker Act would provide the necessary remedy 
for any taking that may occur. In any event, it cannot be 
construed to reflect an unambiguous intention to withdraw 
the Tucker Act remedy. "[W]hether or not the United 
States so intended," any taking claim under FIFRA is one 
"founded upon the Constitution," and is thus remediable 
under the Tucker Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act 
Cases, 419 U. S., at 126. Therefore, where the operation of 
the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions of 
FIFRA effect a taking of property belonging to Monsanto, an 
adequate remedy for the taking exists under the Tucker Act. 
The District Court erred in enjoining the taking. 
VII 
Because we hold that the Tucker Act is available as a rem-
edy for any uncompensated taking Monsanto may suffer as a 
result of Ui'e"- operatiun of the--ctiallenge<!__proVISlons of 
FIFRA, w~ conclucie that .Monsanto's challenges to the con-
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n!}t rip~or our resolution. Because of the availability of the 
Tucker Act, Monsanto's ability to obtain just compensation 
does not depend solely on the validity of the statutory com-
pensation scheme. The operation of the arbitration proce-
dure affects only Monsanto's ability to vindicate its statutory 
right to obtain compensation from a subsequent applicant 
whose registration application relies on data originally sub-
mitted by Monsanto, not its constitutional right to just 
compensation. 
Monsanto did not allege or establish that it had been in-
jured by actual arbitration under the statute. While the 
District Court acknowledged that Monsanto had received 
several offers of compensation from applicants for registra-
tion, 564 F. Supp., at 561, it did not find that EPA had con-
sidered Monsanto's data in considering another application. 
Further, Monsanto and any subsequent applicant may nego-
tiate and reach agreement concerning an outstanding offer. 
If they do not reach agreement, then the controversy must 
go to arbitration. Only after EPA has considered data sub-
mitted by Monsanto in evaluating another application and an 
arbitrator has made an award will Monsanto's claims with re-
spect to the constitutionality of the arbitration scheme be-
come ripe. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental 
Study Group, Inc., 438 U. S. 59, 81 (1978); Regional Rail Re-
organization Act Cases, 419 U. S., at 138. 
VIII 
We find no constitutional infirmity in the challenged provi-
sions of FIFRA. Operation of the provisions may effect a 
taking with respect to certain health, safety, and environ-
mental data constituting a trade secret under state law and 
designated by Monsanto as a trade secret upon submission to 
EPA between October 22, 1972, and September 30, 1978. 19 
19 We emphasize that nothing in our opinion prohibits EPA's consider-
ation or disclosure, in a manner authorized by FIFRA, of data submitted to 
it by Monsanto. Our decision merely holds that, with respect to a certain 
-
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But whatever taking may occur is one for a public use, and a 
Tucker Act remedy is available to provide Monsanto with 
just compensation. Once a taking has occurred, the proper 
forum for Monsanto's claim is the Claims Court. Monsanto's 
challenges to the constitutionality of the arbitration proce-
dure are not yet ripe for review. The judgment of the Dis-
trict Court is therefore vacated and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or deci-
sion of this case. 
limited class of data submitted by Monsanto to EPA, EPA actions under 
the data-disclosure and data-consideration provisions of the statute may 
give Monsanto a claim for just compensation. 
·-
- -dac 06/07/84 
To: JUSTICE POWELL 
From: David 
Re: Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196 
Justice Blackmun's opinion differs from the view that 
you expressed at conference in one respect. The opinion holds 
that the Trade Secrets Act, 18 u.s.c. §1905, created no expecta-
tion of confidentiality with respect to trade secrets submitted 
to the EPA prior to 1972. Op., at 19-22. The Act contains an 
exception for disclosures "authorized by law," and Justice Black-
mun correctly observes that there was a substantial probability 
that Congress would authorize disclosure of health and safety 
data. an authorization would have been valid for previously 
.---
submitted data. Absent some legislative indication that no such 
authorization would occur, appee cannot demonstrate a reasonable 
"investment-backed expectation" of confidentiality for data sub-
mitted prior to 1972 . 
I recommend that you join Justice Blackmun's opinion. 
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83-196 Ruckelshaus v . Monsanto Company 
Dear Harry: 
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CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
-
~n.vrtm.t ~t it! 141 ~ittb ~talt,s-
Jlzudfi:ngton. ~. <q. 2llffe~, 
June 8, 1984 
No. 83-196 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 
Dear Harry, 
I expect to join most of your very fine op1n1on in this 
case, but I have reservations about Part IVB and your conclusion 
regarding the pre-1972 data on p.24 of your circulation . 
You conclude that data submitted to EPA before 1972 may 
be used within the agency, in connection with "me-too" 
applications, and may also be disclosed to the public. I am not 
sure that I can go along with either conclusion. 
I definitely feel that the Trade Secrets Act gave pre-1972 
applicants a firm expectation that the data would not be publicly 
disclosed. Even if use of the data for "me-too" applications 
within EPA were permissible, non-disclosure to the public could 
be vitally important for applicants who market their products--
and therefore undergo regulatory review--in other countries. 
I also remain uncomfortable about the use of pre-1972 data in 
connection with "me-too" applications. The District Court found 
that prior to 1972 only two competitors' registrations were 
granted on the basis of data submitted by Monsanto, and that 
Monsanto had no knowledge of either of these registrations prior 
to their being granted. These facts, together with the the Trade 
Secrets Act and the other matters discussed in footnote 14 of 
your draft, lead me to conclude that Monsanto did have a 
reasonable expectation that trade secrets from its pre-1972 
submissions would not be used as a basis for issuing licenses to 
others. 
If you are not inclined to modify Part IVB, I will 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 12, 1984 
Re: No. 83-196-Ruckelshaus. v. Monsanto 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Justice Blackmun 
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J U S TICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
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:.rulfin¼lrou. ~. QI. 20,~, 
June 12, 1984 
Re: 83-196 - Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company 
Dear Harry: 
You have written a fine opinion and I will certainly 
join most of it, including Parts I, II, III, IV-A and B, and 
V. My main reservation is with Part IV-C. I am not sure 
that any question concerning the data submitted between 1972 
and J978 is ripe for decis i on on the oresent record. 
Whi l e it is certain l y possibl e that EPA may find it 
appropriate to d i sclose publ icly some confidential data that 
Monsanto submitted to it between 1972 and 1978, or that it 
may use some of that data in revjewjnq some ot~er company's 
application for registration of its pesticide, it is not 
clear to me that it i s yet appropriate to say that this 
would constitute a tak i ng wi thout just compensation. The 
value of the data appears to consist entirely in its use to 
Monsanto's competitors in registering their own pesticides. 
However, under the statute whenever they do make use of the 
data they must compensate Monsanto. We should not presume 
that arbitrators' awards will be too small to compensate 
Monsanto ful l y for the reduction in the market value of the 
data. The statute appears to require arbitrators to ensure 
that Monsanto recover its costs of developing data from its 
competitors, and cost should be an adequate proxy for market 
value. Thus arbitration may well ensure that Monsanto 
recovers the full market value of its trade secrets -- just 
compensation. Thus it is not clear to me that the statute 
will necessarily operate to take Monsanto's property without 
just compensation, as you seem to suggest in Part IV-C of 
your opinion. 
Until there has been a specific use of Monsanto's data 
in processing another company's application, followed by a 
specific claim for compensation and a factual record 
supporting the conclusion that Monsanto was undercompensated 
... 
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in a constitutional sense by the arbitration award, the 
po~sibility that Monsanto's property will be taken is surely 
too speculative to declare the statute unconstitutional on 
its face and enjoin its operation. If you could alter your 
analysis in Part IV-C slightly to indicate that it is not 
yet clear that Monsanto will not rece i ve just compensation, 
I could join it. 
This reasoning is supported by your holding in Part VI 
that the Tucker Act is available to Monsanto, and your 
further holding in Part VII that Monsanto's claims are now 
premature. Since it can seek a remedy for any 
undercompensation of a constitutional magnitude there, it 
seems especially inappropriate to prejudge the taking issue 
at this juncture. While I do not think Part VI is strictly 
necessary to the holding, I could surely join it to support 
the conclusion that Monsanto's takings claim is premature. 
I do not think we are very far apart, especially since 
your ultimate iudgment is that the Act is const i tutional and 
that any takinqs claim concerning the 1972-1978 data is now 
premature. If you can see your way clear to making these 
changes I would be happy to join you. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE W ILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 12, 1984 
Re: No. 83-196 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Company 
Dear Harry: 
I think you have written an excellent op1n1on in this 
case, but I am troubled by a couple of points which I want 
to call to your attention. 
The first question pertains to the post-1978 data 
submitted by Monsanto, which is treated at pages 17-19 of 
your draft. Does this portion of your opinion decide, or at 
least intimate, that it would be consistent with the 
"takings" clause for a board of supervisors to provide that 
all submissions for subdivision of more than 40 acres made 
after a particular date would have to include a deed of at 
least 25% of the gross acreage owned to the county as a 
park? I have no desire to see that question decided one way 
or the other by this opinion. 
The second "problem" in my mind is the apparent 
facility with which we resort to Tucker Act relief in 
connection with a statute which Congress seems to have 
intended only as a regulatory measure and not as an 
invocation of the government's condemnation power. I fear 
that if we are too generous in permitting Tucker Act relief 
through the Court of Claims, the government may chose to 
defend the constitutionality of a statute against a 
"takings" clause claim by only half-heartedly defending 
against the claim, or perhaps conceding its validity, while 
going on to contend that the statute is not unconstitutional 
.-- ' - -- 2 -
because resort may be had to the Court of Claims. In short, 
I think that the Solicitor General's point of view might be 
quite different from the point of view of the majority in 
Congress who enacted the legislation. 
Justice Blackmun 
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Re: No. 83-196 - Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co. 
Dear Bill, John, and Sandra: 
June 15, 1984 
Thank you for your respective notes . The new draft enclosed, I 
believe, accommodates John fully and, to an extent, accommodates 
Bill. It does not go along with Sandra's suggestions. I doubt if 
she anticipated that it would, for she already has circulated her 
partial dissent . 
While I am sympathetic to Bill's concerns, I do not believe that 
the opinion raises either of the problems to which he alluoes. 
With respect to the subdivision hypothetical, I do not see that 
this case would be dispositive or even highly supportive of the find-
ing that there is no taking. As Bill wrote in Kaiser Aetna, the 
inquiry into whether a taking has occurred is an inherently factual 
one, and the facts in this case are vastly different from those in 
the hypothetical. Throughout parts IV-A and IV-B, we emphasize the 
point that the pesticide industry is a highly regulated one. In 
Bill's example, I would suspect that our decision would rest on many 
factors, possibly including whether the claim is being made by one 
who purchased the property before or after the imposition of the 
statute. 
With respect to Bill's concerns about allowing a Tucker Act 
remedy, I do not feel that this opinion pushes the state of the law 
beyond where it has been since the Regional Rail Act Reorganization 
Cases were decided. I also do not think that this is a case where 
the SG has been unfaithful to the intent of Congress. As is men-
tioned in the opinion, the legislative history contains language that 
indicates that Congress saw the data as property. The inclusion of 
the arbitration scheme also shows Congress' intention that original 
submitters receive some sort of compensation. Thus, I do not think 
it likely that Congress had no inkling that this statute would be 
construed by the courts as a taking statute rather than as a regula-
tory statute. As for the concern about other statutes, there is 
little we can do to prevent the sort of action on the part of the SG 
that Bill mentions. I think we have to rely on the SG's good faith 
in construing the statute or on our own ability to discern intent 
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